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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LARRY D. SCHIEVING, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
13930 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant was charged by the State of Utah with 
mishandling of public monies, a felony in the third degree, 
in violation of Section 76-8-402 (a) and (h), U. C. A. 1953, 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of guilty, 
defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in his favor 
as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Larry D. Schieving, was employed in 
the Traffic Department, Violations Division, of Salt Lake 
City as assistant director of that department. Part of 
his duties as assistant director was the handling of bail 
money and bail receipts from the County Jail. On Janu-
ary 7, 1974, two copies of bail receipt No. 5450 and the 
corresponding bail money of $170.00 were discovered miss-
ing by the head of the department. The defendant was 
subsequently charged with mishandling of public monies 
concerning the missing $170.00. 
At one point during the trial the following exchange 
occurred between the prosecuting attorney and the de-
fendant on cross examination: 
Q. And then when you discovered for instance 
on 5450 for the $170.00 that that money was 
missing as well as the missing bail receipts you 
assumed somebody else stole that money? Is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. I 
Q. And you immediately reported that to Mr. 
Budd, I presume? 
A. I t was Mr. Budd who told me that that 
money—that those receipts were not—he was 
not able to find them. I was not the one who 
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discovered that they were missing. I was ap-
proached, and then I did check after I was ap-
proached and reported back to Mr. Budd that 
I could not account for what happened to the 
money on those cases. 
Q. And you say "those cases." There was more 
than one, was there not? 
Mr. White: Object. 
The Court: Overruled. 
pp. 159-160, Official Transcript. 
Whereupon the prosecutor was allowed by the court over 
objection and after refusing to allow defense counsel to 
request a proffer of proof from the prosecutor to delve 
more explicitly into other shortages in the department. 
At another point during the trial the prosecutor was 
allowed by the court over objection to introduce evidence 
concerning defendant's prior indebtedness as a possible 
motive for the crime. Page 103, Official Transcript. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING EVIDENCE OF OTHER SHORTAGES 
WITHIN THE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS BUR-
EAU TO BE RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE 
DURING THE TRIAL. 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 
"evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong 
on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dis-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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position to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for 
an inference that he committed another crime or civil 
wrong on another specified occasion, but, . . . such evi-
dence is admissible when relevant to prove some other 
material fact including absence of mistake or accident, 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge 
or identity." 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence additionally 
requires that the judge may, in his discretion, exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the risk that its admission will 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. 
The prosecution relies for admission of evidence of 
other shortages upon the defendant's own statements 
to the effect that he could not account for what happened 
to the money on "those cases". However, the defendant's 
use of the term "those cases" referred only to the other 
copies of the missing receipt which he had referred to 
in his previous sentence. The expression "those cases" 
arose only as evidence of the defendant's confusion re-
sulting from the form of the question put to him by the 
prosecutor. This confusion could have easily been clari-
fied at the time but the court refused to allow defense 
counsel to approach the bench and explain the problem. 
In 1950 the Utah Supreme Court considered the case 
of State v. Harries, 118 Ut. 260, 221 P. 2d 605 (1950), 
a bribery case where evidence of bribes other than the 
one charged was admitted. The court upheld the ad-
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mission over a vigorous dissent. This case can be easily dis-
tinguished, however, from the instant case. In Harries, 
there was a substantial connection between the other 
bribes and the defendant in the form of witnesses who 
testified that the defendant had received other bribes. 
In the present case, though, there was no criminal rela-
tionship established between the defendant and other 
shortages within the department. The only evidence in-
troduced was that other shortages existed and no evi-
dence that the defendant was criminally responsible for 
them was introduced. 
Since the decision was rendered in 1950, the Harries 
case has been cited by any court only once in a footnote 
to a concurring opinion. State v. Winget, 6 Ut. 2d 234, 
310 P. 2d 739 (1957). Although distinguished from the 
present case, the dissenting opinion in Harries by Chief 
Justice Pratt, quoting from a California decision, offers 
some enlightening comments which are applicable to the 
present case. 
"Circumstantial proof of a crime charged can-
not be intermingled with circumstantial proof 
of suspicious prior occurences in such manner 
that it reacts as a psychological factor with re-
sult that the proof of the crime charged is used 
to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion in 
the mind that the defendant must have commit-
ted the prior act, and the conclusion that he 
must have committed the prior act is then used 
in turn to strengthen the theory and induce the 
conclusion that he must also have committed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the crime charged. This is but a vicious circle. 
Here the evidence of suspicious prior occur-
rences affords no substantial proof whatso-
ever connecting the defendant in any way with 
the charge on which he was tried." State v. 
Harries, supra at 623, quoting from People v. 
Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550,145 P.2d 7, 22. 
This is precisely the situation in this case. The only 
evidence of the crime charged introduced in the trial 
was dmimstantiai and only more cmximstantial evidence, 
if any, to connect the defendant with other shortages. 
This is the type of circumstantial proof of a crime charged 
intermingled with drcumstantial proof of suspicious prior 
occurrences referred to by the California court. Admis-
sion of such evidence cannot be other than highly preju-
dicial, as well as a clear violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional right to the presumption of innoncence. 
This court has not otherwise been previously pre-
sented with this precise issue on review. However, there 
are numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding that 
"because of the potential for prejudice the trial judge 
should act with extreme caution and any doubt as to the 
admissibility of evidence of the other crime should be 
resolved in favor of the defendant and against admissibil-
ity." People v. Kelly, 66 Oal. 2d 232,424 P. 2d 947; People 
v. Adamson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 74, 36 Cal. Rptr. 894; De-
Vore v. U. S., (C. A. 9) 368 F. 2d; San Fratello v. State, 
154 So. 2d 327 (Fla. App.); Gorski v. State, 1 Md. App. 
200, 228 A. 2d 835; Sail v. State, 157 Neb. 688, 61 N. W. 
2d 256; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39,113 N. E. 556; Jones 
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v. State, 321 P. 2d 432 (Okla.); Harris v. State, 88 Okla. 
Crirn. 422, 204 P. 2d 305; State v. Gardner, 225 Or. 376, 
358 P. 2d 557. 
Utah Law is in accord with the holdings in the cases 
cited above. Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence gives 
the judge discretion to exclude any evidence if he finds 
that its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the risk that its admission will create the risk of undue 
prejudice. In this case the prejudice was substantial 
because up until this point in the trial there was very 
minimal and only circumstantial evidence to connect the 
defendant with the cash shortage charged in the infor-
mation. However, the disclosure to the jury of the fact 
that there were other shortages within the departaient 
coupled with the fact that the defendant had procured 
a loan in order to make up one other cash shortage was 
extremely prejudicial. Such a disclosure could easily give 
rise to the inference in the mind of any reasonable juror! 
that if the defendant had assumed responsibility for one 
other shortage then he must be responsible for the cash 
shortage alleged in the information. This admission then 
was highly prejudicial, especially when introduced with-
out proper foundation in the form of a proffer of proof. 
If such a proffer of proof had been required it would have 
been shown that the defendant did not refer to other 
shortages when he mentioned "those cases." 
Assuming, arguendo, that even if "those cases" did 
refer to other shortages within the traffic violations de-
partment, the evidence should still have been ruled inad-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
missible because there was no criminal relationship es-
tablished between the other shortages and the defendant. 
In People v. Kelly, supra (1967), the California Supreme 
Court considered the question of the admissibility of evi-
dence of crimes other than the one charged. The general 
rule, as in the Utah Rules of Evidence, is that evidence 
of other crimes is inadmissible when it is offered to prove 
criminal disposition or propensity on the part of the ac-
cused because the probative value of such evidence is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. The purpose of this 
rule is to avoid placing the accused in the position of 
having to defend against crimes for which he has not 
been charged and to guard against the probability that 
evidence of other criminal acts to prove that the defen-
*dant committed the crime charged would assume undue 
proportion and would unnecessarily prejudice the de-
fendant in the eyes of the jury. Kelly, supra at 953. 
In no event, should evidence of such other criminal 
acts be admissible unless a criminal relationship between 
such acts and the defendant is established. It has fre-
quently been recognized that because of the sound rea-
sons behind the general rule of exclusion and for the 
reasons above stated, the relevancy of evidence of other 
crimes, and therefore its admissibility, must be examined 
with extreme care and the evidence should be received 
only with the utmost caution. Unless the criminal con-
nection with the other crime is clearly perceived the 
question must be resolved in favor of the accused. Kelly, 
supra at 954, citing also People v. Albertson, supra; People 
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v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 156, 280 P. 2d 769, (dissenting opin-
ion). In every ease the possibility of severing relevant 
from irrelevant portions of the evidence should be con-
sidered to protect the accused from undue prejudice. In 
this case such an attempt was not made as the trial 
court refused to require any proffer of proof from the 
prosecutor and summarily admitted the evidence. 
In the present case the only relationship established 
between prior shortages in the department and the defen-
dant was that the defendant on one occasion accepted 
administrative responisbility for some missing money and 
therefore endeavored to make up the difference out of 
his own pocket. Nothing was introduced into evidence 
that would criminally connect the defendant with the 
theft of the money on the prior occasion. Had such been 
the case, then the defendant should have also been 
charged with that crime in order that he could properly 
defend himself against such a charge. Again, this is an 
example of circumstantial evidence being bolstered by 
circumstantial evidence of suspicious circumstances. 
There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
with similar holdings requiring that such evidence be held 
inadmissible unless the criminal relationship between the 
defendant and such criminal acts is substantially estab-
lished. State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541 (Pla.); State v. 
Hines, 270 Minn. 30,133 N. W. 2d 371; State v. Freeman, 
245 La. 665, 160 So. 2d 571; State v. Stephenson, 191 
Kan. 424, 381 P. 2d 335; People v Donaldson, 8 111. 2d 
510,134 N. E. 2d 776. 
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Evidence of other shortages could be admissible if 
offered to prove a particular type of modus operandi. 
Such was not the case in this proceeding. The other 
shortages were different from the crime charged against 
the defendant. One other shortage consisted of missing 
money but no missing receipts, another consisted of miss-
ing receipts only, another both missing money and mis-
placed receipts. One shortage even occurred subsequent 
to the crime charged. Each other shortage within the 
department was substantially different from the one 
charged aginst the defendant. In no event was there any 
criminal connection between any other shortages and 
the defendant established. 
On the basis of the rationale outlined above, the trial 
court should have ruled that proffer of proof was required 
in order to insure that, (1) "those cases" did in fact 
refer to other shortages, and that (2) there was a crim-
inal relationship established between the other shortages 
and the defendant. Had such a proffer of proof been re-
quired the evidence of prior shortages within the traffic 
violations bureau would have been ruled inadmissible pur-
suant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because 
of the risk that it would unduly prejudice the defendant 
in the minds of the jurors. For these reasons the trial 
court committed reversible error by admitting such evi-
dence. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMIT-
TING EVIDENCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS 
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OF THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW MOTIVE 
FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME 
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. 
During the trial the prosecution was allowed to in-
troduce evidence concerning two prior judgments and 
garnishments against the defendant in order to show 
a possible motive for the commission of the crime charged. 
Such admission was duly objected to by the defendant. 
Page 103 Official Transcript. The major objection to the 
admission of such evidence is that by its admission it 
deprives many persons of the Equal Protection of the 
law by unduly prejudicing poor or indigenous persons. 
In such cases the probative value of such evidence is far 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the jury. Dean 
Wigmore has stated that "[U]ndoubtedly the lack of 
money is logically connected with a crime of financial 
gain. The trouble is that it would prove too much against 
too many." Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd ed., 1940) Section 
392, page 34. 
Although this precise issue has never been ruled on 
by this Court, many courts in other jurisdictions have 
considered this question. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
in State v. Mathis, 47 N. J. 538, 218 A. 2d 405, noted: 
"The lack of money by A might be relevant 
enough to show the probability of A's desiring 
to commit a crime in order to obtain money. 
But the practical result of such a doctrine 
would be to put a poor person under so much 
unfair suspicion and at such a relative dis-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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advantage that for reasons of fairness this 
argument has seldom been countenanced as evi-
dence of the graver crimes, particularly of vio-
lence." Mathis, supra at 538. 
Such reasoning should also be applied to cases such 
as the case presently before this court for exactly the 
reasons outlined above. In this case the possibility 
of creating substantial prejudice is equally applicable 
whether the crime is a crime of violence or a so-called 
"White collar" crime. The practical result of evidence of 
the defendant's impecuniosaty is that it would place any 
poor person immediately under grave suspicion in the 
eyes of the jury and would thereby greatly disadvantage 
him. Such evidence should therefore be held inadmissible. 
State v. Copeland, 94 N. J. Super. 196, 227 A. 2d 523 
(1967). 
Prosecution arguments calling attention to the de-
fendant's lack of funds as a possible motive for a crime 
in which he attempted to obtain money has been con-
demned in various cases. In State v. Copeland, supra, 
two young men were charged with entering a building 
with the intent to steal. Although the court did not 
decide that the particular type of evidence admitted was 
prejudicial it did admit that the potential for prejudice 
was extremely great and that in many situations such 
an admission would be improper. 
In People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N. Y. 
2d 518, the New York Court reversed a robbery convic-
tion. In a memorandum decision the court held that a 
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new trial was required in the interest of justice because 
of the improper and prejudicial conduct of the prosecu-
tor. One of the statements by the prosecutor in closing 
argument which the court held to be improper concerned 
the defendant being a recipient of welfare and that he 
wanted to supplement that welfare allowance by a little 
extra-curricular activity. In Dorger v. State, 40 Ohio 
App. 415, 179 N. E. 143, the Ohio Appellate Court held 
that reference to the defendant's having been reduced to 
a pauper and not being able to obtain any money was 
an appeal to the sympathy of the jury and was improper. 
A number of cases hold that such a reference, though 
improper, will not require reversal where the evidence 
as to guilt is so clear that the appellate court is con-
vinced that the jury would have reached the same result 
even if the error had not occurred. In United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (1940), 310 U. S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 
1091, the Supreme Court listed the fact that the case 
was not a weak one as one of its reasons for concluding 
that improper arguments of the prosecutor did not con-
stitute prejudicial error under all the circumstances. 
Conversely, any weakenss or uncertainty in the proof 
of defendant's guilt will strengthen the probability that 
the jury may have been influenced by the improper argu-
ment. Thus, in Read v. United States, (1930, C. A. 8 
Iowa), 42 F. 2d 636, the court pointed to the fact that 
the case was a close one on the facts as one reason for 
regarding the prosecutor's argument concerning the 
wealth of the defendants as prejudicial error. 
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In People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 53 N. E. 497, 
a conviction for cxwiniving in the auditing of a fraudulent 
claim against the city was reversed because of the con-
cluding argument by the district attorney describing the 
poverty and suffering of some city taxpayers and de-
scribing defendant as a thief living in a palace on the 
proceeds of public plunder. The court felt that there 
was a strong probability that the errors in admitting 
such evidence was highly prejudicial and did affect the 
verdict and therefore the conviction was reversed. 
In Logan v. State, 66 Tex. Crim. 506, 148 S. W. 713, 
the court concluded that although the prosecutor's im-
proper argument and other errors noted might not in 
themselves be sufficient for reversal, yet, taking them 
into consideration together with the unsatisfactory state 
of the evidence, the judgment should be reversed. And 
in Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex. Grim. 100, 167 S. W. 356, the 
fact that the evidence as to guilt was in sharp conflict 
was one of the factors considered in reaching the con-
clusion that the prosecutor's improper argument was 
prejudicial. Such reasoning even further strengthens the 
prejudicial effect of this type of evidence in oases such 
as the present case where any evidence of guilt was ex-
tremely weak and highly speculaitiva 
On the basis of the authorities cited above it is ap-
parent that the problem of the admission of evidence as 
to the financial status of the defendant is one that has 
been considered many times by courts of various juris-
dictions. In the instant case the problem is substantial 
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because any reference to other extrinsic factors concern-
ing the defendant's financial status as a possible motive 
of the defendant was extremely prejudicial. For this 
reason the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 
defendant's prior financial condition. 
POINT III. 
TNE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIS-
MISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT DUE TO THE FACT 
THAT THE ORDINANCES UNDER WHICH 
THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED DID 
NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT. 
During the course of the trial the defendant moved 
to dismiss the charge against him upon the grounds that 
the information as stated did not apply to him. The in-
formation as stated required that the defendant "did 
without authority of law appropriate the money to his 
own use" or "willfully omitted to transfer said money 
as required by law." Although the court had taken ju-
dicial notice of Sections 25-17-14 and 24-4-5 of the Salt 
Lake City Ordinances, those ordinances do not apply 
to the defendant. 
Section 25-17-14 states that all fines and forfeitures 
for the violation of ordinances and all money collected 
for licenses or otherwise shall be paid into the treasury 
of the corporation as prescribed by ordinance. In con-
nection with that, Section 24-4-5 states that "the head 
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of each office where fees and monies are or shall be 
collected shall at the close of each day's business cover 
into the city treasury all fees and monies collected by 
by his office." This applies to the head of the depart-
ment and not to any of his assistants. Further there is 
no other statute which applies to deputies in any de-
partment. 
It was not the policy of the Traffic Violations Bureau 
to cover this money into the treasury each business day. 
The Supreme Court has defined "cover into the treasury" 
as money actually paid into the treasury as opposed to 
monies deposited with the treasurer, which was the regu-
lar procedure for this office. United States v. Johnston, 
668 U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496. The defendant as assistant 
director was not required to make those deposits. In 
fact, the deposits were actually made by the head cash-
ier even though the head of the department was required 
by statute to make the deposits. The defendant was only 
an assistant in a supervisory capacity and not the head 
of the office. Therefore, the trial court should have dis-
missed the information against the defendant because 
the ordinances under which he was charged did not apply 
to him as assistant director. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that: 
1. The trial court erred in allowing the admission 
of evidence of the existence of prior shortages within the 
Traffic Violations Bureau, that such error was highly 
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prejudicial and can only be cured by reversal of the trial 
court. 
2. That the trial court erred by admitting evidence 
concerning the financial condition of the defendant at 
the time the shortage was discovered in order to show a 
motive for the commission of the crime charged, that 
such evidence was highly prejudicial and can only be 
cured by reversal of the trial court. 
3. That the statute under which the defendant was 
charged in ifae information, U. C. A. Section 76-8-402 (a) 
and (h), did not apply to the defendant by reason of 
Salt Lake City Ordinances 25-17-14 and 24-4-5 and there-
fore the information against the defendant should have 
been dismissed by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID PAUL WHITE 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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